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I. INTRODUCTION 
“O great people of Egypt, dear citizens standing here in the Revolution 
square, in freedom square, in Tahrir Square, in martyrs’ square, and all 
citizens standing in all liberty squares across the homeland, Egypt, in 
villages, towns and cities, in all governorates of Egypt . . . . I came to talk 
to you today, because I believe that you are the source of power and 
legitimacy. . . . I say it with full force ‘No authority is over or above this 
power’. You are the source of power. You are the owners of the will. You 
grant power to whomsoever you choose, and you withdraw power from 
whomsoever you choose.”1 
- President Mohamed Morsi, Inaugural Speech in Tahrir Square, June 29, 
 
 1.  Mohamed Morsi, President of Egypt, Inaugural Address in Tahrir Square 
(June 29, 2012), translated in President Mohamed Morsi’s Speech in Tahrir 
Square, Friday June 29, 2012, Ikhwan Web (June 30, 2012),  
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30153.  
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2012 
The initial victory of the Arab Spring2 was entrenched within the 
people’s right to protest.3 When the first round of masses came onto 
the streets, the world watched as millions living under the rule of 
authoritarianism were able to bring about monumental change 
through protests.4 Even in the murky and volatile post-Arab Spring 
world, the newfound right to protest remains at issue. In international 
law, the right to protest, or freedom of assembly as it is referred to in 
the legal context, is paramount for the legal rights of citizens within 
democratic societies. Article 21 of the International Covenant for 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) provides that “the right to 
peaceful assembly shall be recognized” barring certain enumerated 
restrictions.5 
Egypt presents an interesting case for article 21 of the ICCPR 
 
 2.  Compare Roger Hardy, Egypt Protests: An Arab Spring as Old Order 
Crumbles?, BBC (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
12339521 (providing an example of “Arab Spring” as a means of referring to the 
protest movement in question), with The Arab Awakening, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH 
(Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/2011/02/ 
2011222121213770475.html (demonstrating an example of “Arab Awakening” as 
an alternative designation for the same movement). The term “Arab Spring” refers 
to the sweeping protests throughout several Middle Eastern and North African 
countries. Though the term is rather definitive, and the word “Spring” connotes a 
positive end that has yet to come into fruition. This paper will use the term “Arab 
Spring” as opposed to Arab Awakening or Arab Rising for its familiarity.  
 3.  See Sudarsan Raghavan, Inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, Yemenis Join in 
Anti-Government Protests, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/27/ 
AR2011012702081.html (demonstrating that citizens of Arab states felt more 
empowered in their right to protest as the Arab Spring continued, thereby 
furthering its success in increasing the number of protesters and organized 
protests).  
 4.  Id. (discussing the burgeoning threat to extant Arab regimes posed by 
protests even at an early point in the Arab Spring movement). 
 5.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 21, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/ 
Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing 
that restrictions may be permitted “in conformity with the law,” and if they are 
“necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”). 
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because the country recently began its democratic process.6 Since 
Egypt signed the ICCPR in 1981, it was not previously privy to a key 
element of article 21 of the ICCPR as “the focus of freedom of 
assembly is clearly on its democratic function in the process of 
forming, expressing and implementing political opinions.”7 
Therefore, it is clear that at least prior to the ouster of President 
Hosni Mubarak, and the decades of authoritarianism under his rule, 
Egypt did not qualify as a democracy in light of article 21’s emphasis 
on freedom to assemble as an essential democratic function.8 
However, democracy is a process rather than a definitive point.9 
Egypt, along with a few other post-Arab Spring countries, has 
embarked on the democratic process, and the codified right to protest 
within the post-revolution 2012 Constitution has been a great victory 
in this regard.10 
Following the ratification of the 2012 Constitution, leaders have 
repeatedly violated their international obligation to ensure their 
citizens the right to protest. Egypt’s first violation occurred when the 
 
 6.  See Egypt Crisis: President Hosni Mubarak Resigns as Leader, BBC (Feb. 
12, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12433045 [hereinafter 
Mubarak Resigns] (reporting on the ouster, clarifying that though his title was 
President and Egypt had the façade of a democracy, Mubarak “ruled for 30 years, 
suppressing dissent and protest, and jailing opponents.”).   
 7.  See Manfred Nowak, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
COMMENTARY 481, 490 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (emphasis added) (comparing the 
unique quality of article 21 of the ICCPR to similar articles in other conventions 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as to other articles 
within the ICCPR). 
 8.  Cf. William J. Dobson, THE DICTATOR’S LEARNING CURVE: INSIDE THE 
GLOBAL BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY (2013) (writing about how Mubarak began 
slightly opening the political process before the 2011 Revolution though ultimately 
the country had an authoritarian governing structure).  
 9.  Many in the transitional justice field feel that the democratic process itself 
is the goal, and there is no point at which we stop striving for that ideal. See 
Collette Rausch, Democracy Is a Process – and a Journey, U.S. INST. PEACE (July 
12, 2011), available at http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/democracy-process-and-
journey. 
 10.  See generally Faith Lemon, The Uncertain Future of Human Rights in the 
Arab Spring, RTS. NEWS (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://hrcolumbia.org/rightsnews/nov2011/uncertain_future (cautioning that while 
rhetoric surrounding the Arab Spring movements highlights positive changes and 
optimism, “a summative evaluation of the Arab Spring as an impetus for durable 
democracy or improved human rights conditions in [The Middle East and North 
Africa] remains elusive.”).  
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Muslim Brotherhood-led parliament passed restrictive laws regarding 
the notification requirement prior to a protest.11 Egypt’s second 
violation occurred during the military-led government’s violent 
crackdown on pro-Morsi protests during and after the July 2013 
turmoil that resulted in President Morsi’s ouster.12 
As is unsurprising in post-revolutionary turmoil, Egypt’s post-
Arab Spring unrest resulted in a violation of international law, 
especially the legal right to freedom of assembly.13 However, there 
are two unique elements to an analysis of post-revolutionary events 
in Egypt. First, Egypt falls within a gap in international legal 
discourse such that it is unclear if it is bound by the ICCPR’s right to 
freedom of assembly during its period of transition into democracy.14 
Second, Egypt presents an inimitable case study in this neglected 
area of international law because Egypt’s democratic transition was 
not brought on by war or civil conflict.15 Unlike other post-Arab 
Spring transitional countries such as Libya and Syria, Egypt’s civil 
society—legal and government institutions—remain largely intact 
following the 2011 revolution.16 Therefore, there is a basis from 
 
 11.  See New Egyptian Protest Law Threatens Right to Protest: NGO, AHRAM 
ONLINE (Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/ 
64/67865/Egypt/Politics-/New-Egyptian-protest-law-threatens-right-to-protes.aspx 
[hereinafter New Egyptian Protest Law] (explaining that the post-Arab Spring 
protest law in Egypt “obligates demonstration organisers to give an official notice 
to the authorities about the time, route and demands of any protest three days in 
advance,” and characterizing such obligations as “stringent and unrealistic 
restrictions”).   
 12.  See Jeffrey Fleishman, Death Toll in Egypt Hits 638; Morsi Supporters 
Vow to Keep Protesting, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/ 
world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-egypt-crackdown-toll-20130815,0,1160232.story 
(describing the violence including a climbing death toll following the July ouster 
of President Morsi, and its use in quashing protests by the Egyptian public).  
 13.  See discussion infra Part III (explaining Egypt’s violations of the ICCPR’s 
article 21 guarantees of freedom of assembly).  
 14.  See discussion infra Part III.C (categorizing Egypt’s Goldilocks Complex 
in falling in the gap of governing international law regarding transitional societies).  
 15.  Hosni Mubarak Resigns as President, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 11, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121125158705862.html 
(explaining that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned his office without 
being violently overthrown or removed). 
 16.  See Sharif Abdel Kouddous, What Led to Morsi’s Fall – and What Comes 
Next?, NATION (July 5, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/175128/what-led-
morsis-fall-and-what-comes-next# (explaining that “the [Muslim] Brotherhood 
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which to evaluate both Egypt’s domestic and international legal 
obligations to upholding its citizenry’s right to protest.17 
Egypt violated article 21 of the ICCPR in two general instances. 
As events in Egypt are fluid and likely to change, this comment will 
freeze analysis at the time of the military’s violent suppression of 
demonstrations, just before the military declared a state of 
emergency on August 14, 2013. This comment will first provide 
background by focusing on Egypt’s domestic and international laws 
at the time of the freezing point.18 Subsequently, it will look closely 
at the language and interpretations of article 21 of the ICCPR and 
consider the unique significance of democracy to the legal right to 
freedom of assembly.19 
Then, this comment will consider two elements within article 21 
of the ICCPR: its basis in democracy and the impact of a transitional 
state’s legal obligations. The analysis section will consider how these 
two elements intertwine and apply them to Egypt’s recent history to 
determine whether Egypt violated article 21.20Finally, after 
concluding that Egypt did in fact violate international law, this 
comment will offer recommendations for holding Egypt accountable 
for its violations.21 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section begins by breaking down the relevant elements of the 
ICCPR article 21, including its explicit and implicit permissible 
 
kept intact most institutions of the Mubarak regime”).  
 17.  See also Sreeram Sundar Chaulia, The Turmoil in Egypt Underscores Just 
How Fragile the Post-Arab Spring Situation Is, TIMES INDIA (Nov. 26, 2012), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-11-26/edit-
page/35347560_1_president-morsi-mubarak-regime-hosni-mubarak (warning 
against the instability of regime changes and the attendant risks posed to the right 
of protest by new leaders – such as Morsi – attempting to consolidate power). 
 18.  See discussion infra Part II.A (detailing events in Egypt following the 
ouster of President Mubarak that led to violations of article 21 of the ICCPR 
through August 2013, when Egypt declared a state of emergency).  
 19.  See discussion infra Part II.B (expounding upon the various nuances of 
article 21 of the ICCPR).  
 20.  See discussion infra Part III (considering the implications of international 
law on post-Arab Spring events in Egypt).  
 21.  See discussion infra Part IV (listing four recommendations for responding 
to Egypt’s post-Arab Spring violations of article 21 of the ICCPR).  
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restrictions to freedom of assembly. Then it provides a brief timeline 
of events in Egypt as well as the domestic law regarding the right to 
protest. Finally, it briefly discusses the gap in international law 
regarding a country’s international obligations as it embarks on the 
process of democratic transition. 
A. EGYPT: A BRIEF TIMELINE 
Egypt’s transition toward democracy began in January 2011, with 
the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak.22 By June 2012, President 
Mohamed Morsi became the country’s first democratically elected 
leader in its long history.23 Shortly thereafter, the Egyptian Assembly 
adopted its new Constitution in December 2012.24 
In what was seen as a great victory of the Arab Spring,25 the 
Constitution granted Egyptians the right to freedom of assembly, 
giving their citizens the right to peaceful demonstrations and 
gatherings with the requirement of prior notification.26 The 
Constitution does not provide details or limits to the notification 
 
 22.  Mubarak Resigns, supra note 6 (discussing the reaction to President 
Mubarak’s departure from members of the Egyptian political community, as well 
as from the protesters whose demonstrations had precipitated Mubarak’s 
resignation).  
 23.  Kouddous, supra note 15. 
 24.  See Stephanie McCrummen, Egyptian Assembly Rushes to Vote on New 
Constitution, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2012), available at  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/amid-political-crisis-egypts-
constitutional-assembly-prepares-to-vote-on-draft-document/2012/11/29/1aa3f2a2-
3a20-11e2-9258-ac7c78d5c680_story.html (describing the push to adopt a new 
Constitution as President Morsi’s government attempted to transition to normal 
governance); Peter Beaumont, Mohamed Morsi Signs Egypt’s New Constitution 
Into Law, GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/ 
dec/26/mohamed-morsi-egypt-constitution-law. 
 25.  See Samantha Stainburn, Egypt Protest Restrictions: Rights Groups 
Criticize New Draft Law, GLOBAL POST (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-
east/egypt/130214/egypt-protest-restrictions-rights-groups-criticize-ne (writing that 
the codified right to protest in Egypt’s new 2012 Constitution was a great victory 
as it was previously not a right provided to the Egyptian people by law).  
 26.  CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 50, Nov. 29, 2012, 
as ratified Nov. 29, 2012, translated in Nivien Saleh, The 2012 Constitution of 
Egypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index, NIVIEN SALEH, 
http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-2012-translation/#ch-two-2 (last visited 
May 2, 2014).  
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requirement.27 However, the Egyptian parliament has stipulated a 
three-day, detailed notification requirement.28 
Despite these developments, like many other post-revolutionary 
countries, Egypt’s transition continued and still continues to 
experience vicissitudes.  From around February to June 2013, the 
people’s dissatisfaction with President Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood gained traction.  New rounds of protests erupted against 
President Morsi, some of them escalating to violence.29 
In the months leading up to President Morsi’s July 2013 ouster, a 
campaign emerged with the objective of holding Morsi accountable 
for the country’s economic and cultural stagnation.30 By June 2013, a 
campaign known as Tamarod (rebellion) collected over thirty million 
signatures demanding President Morsi’s resignation on the one-year 
anniversary of his election for what many Egyptians saw as his 
failure to effectively govern the country, improve the economy, and 
follow through on his campaign promises.31 
 
 27.  Id. (stating only that the right to protest “requires a notification as 
stipulated by law,” leaving the details to be decided upon by parliament).  
 28.  See New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (showing the excessive 
limitations on protests through a long prior notice requirement as well as 
prohibitive restrictions on the demonstrations’ movement); see also Hend Kortam, 
EIPR Rejects Limitations on Right to Protest, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (May 3, 2013), 
available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/05/03/eipr-rejects-limitations-
on-right-to-protest/ (writing that the human rights organization Egyptian Initiative 
for Personal Rights (EIPR) rejected the substance and the philosophy behind the 
new protest law, arguing that “[p]rotests need protection, not legal limitations. 
What needs regulation and legal limitations is the authority’s intervention in 
peaceful gatherings”). 
 29.  Chaulia, supra note 17 (describing the turmoil in the immediate aftermath 
of Morsi’s election in response to his political maneuvers, “Morsi has 
unexpectedly ignited a war in domestic politics. His declaration on November 22 
arrogating extraordinary powers to the office of the president over the judiciary 
and other public institutions blocking the revolution has triggered mass unrest 
across Egypt and kick-started a cycle of confrontation and realignment among 
different political factions. Massive crowds hailing from different ideological 
camps chanting, ‘Morsi is the new Mubarak’ . . . and that the ‘revolution is 
incomplete’ are demonstrating that nothing is settled yet”).  
 30.  See Egypt’s Tamarod Protest Movement, BBC (July 1 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23131953 (describing the  
movement, Tamarod, as being motivated by concerns over Egypt’s perceived 
socioeconomic collapse during Morsi’s presidency).  
 31.  Id. (discussing the Tamarod’s demands, and describing it as “a new 
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The Tamarod campaign culminated in a mass protest against 
President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood on June 30, 2013.32 
Just a few days later, on July 3, the Egyptian military followed 
through on its ultimatum against the President after he failed to 
effectively placate the protesters.33 On that day, the military 
suspended the 2012 Constitution, and thus also suspended the 
people’s right to protest. Before August 14, 2013, when the military 
declared a state of emergency, the interim Egyptian government 
suppressed dozens of peaceful retaliation protests and sit-ins carried 
out by the Muslim Brotherhood, leaving hundreds of fatalities.34 
Though Egypt continues to experience turmoil in its transition to 
democracy, the events implicating article 21 of the ICCPR for the 
purposes of this paper focus on the period from the Muslim 
Brotherhood-led government to the military-led ouster of President 
Morsi up until the declaration of an emergency state, since this 
period serves as a model for impending transitions and difficulties 
moving forward. 
 
grassroots protest movement in Egypt that . . . was founded in late April by 
members of the Egyptian Movement for Change – better known by its slogan 
Kefaya (Enough) – which pushed for political reform in Egypt under former 
president Hosni Mubarak in 2004 and 2005. Although Kefaya joined in the mass 
protests that forced him to resign in 2011, it did not play a prominent role.”).  
 32.  Id. (describing the June 30, 2013 protest as having been attended by 
“millions of people” in Cairo and elsewhere). 
 33.  See Abigail Hauslohner et al., Egyptian Military Ousts Morsi, Suspends 
Constitution, WASH. POST (July 3, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-
07-03/world/40336012_1_president-mohamed-morsi-wednesday-night-morsi-rally 
(providing an in-depth timeline of events from the build-up before the military’s 
ouster of President Morsi and the detailed and quick succession of events after the 
military intervened on July 3, 2013); see also Sarah Lynch, Egyptians Celebrate in 
the Streets, but Instability Remains, USA TODAY (July 3, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/03/egypt-morsi-deposed-
military/2488057/ (elaborating on the emergency procedures established by the 
military following Morsi’s sidelining).   
 34.  See Warren Murray et al., Egyptian Military Government Declares Month-
Long Emergency – As it Happened, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/14/egypt-clear-cairo-sitins-live 
(describing the brutal tactics utilized by the Egyptian military to clear out camps 
and other demonstrations, leaving 278 PEOPLE DEAD ON ONE DAY).   
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B. ARTICLE 21 OF THE ICCPR 
1. Language Specific to Article 21 
Article 21 of the ICCPR explicitly protects a citizen’s right to 
peaceful assembly: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed 
in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.35 
This background section considers first, the Convention’s 
deliberate focus on democracy; second, the definition of a 
“democratic society” for the purposes of the ICCPR; and, third, the 
restrictions permitted by the language of article 21 and the Human 
Rights Committee’s (“HRC”) interpretation of this language. 
2. Article 21’s Roots in Democracy 
Article 21 is one of a few articles in which drafting states 
deliberately included the language of democracy.36 The right set out 
in article 21 is not only necessary to attain a certain purpose but also 
a contingency of democratic society.37 Drafting states ultimately 
concluded that any limitation of the right to freedom of assembly 
must be implemented in accordance with “certain minimum 
democratic principles” to effectively protect this right.38 Therefore, 
article 21 of the ICCPR and its restrictions clause implicate a 
threshold of democratic principles that the government in question 
 
 35.  ICCPR, supra note 5, at 171 (emphasis added to highlight elements of 
article 21 that will be expounded upon for the purposes of this comment). 
 36.  See Nowak, supra note 7, at 490 (contrasting article 21 to the limitation 
clauses in article 12 freedom of movement, article 18 freedom of thought, and 
article 19 freedom of expression).  
 37.  Id. (explaining that “interference with the rights set out in . . . [article 
21] . . . must be not only necessary to attain a certain purpose but also ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’”). 
 38.  Id. (elaborating on the role of the United Nations in setting these 
principles, particularly inasmuch as they should be devised in accord with the 
principles of the “the U.N. Charter, the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] 
and the two Covenants.”) 
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must meet.39 
3. The Definition of Democracy in International Law and the ICCPR 
International law does not provide a recognized, singular 
definition of democracy.40 Nonetheless, it has come to narrow the 
meaning of democracy to the process of popular sovereignty.41 
Specifically, article 25 of the ICCPR codifies the right to political 
participation through free and fair elections.42 This indicates that the 
extent of a state’s compliance with certain minimum democratic 
principles under international law is generally judged, perhaps to the 
extent of oversimplification, by the presence of free and fair 
 
 39.  Id. at 482 (“It has been generally recognized in human rights theory and 
case law in many countries that the State is under a special duty of protection in the 
general interest of ensuring the functioning of a democratic process of forming, 
expressing and implementing political opinions and decisions.”). Cf. JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127, 131 
(2006) (sparking a debate on the cost-benefit analysis proposed by the authors 
regarding why states, both liberal-democratic and authoritarian, ratify international 
treaties such as the ICCPR, concluding that “[f]or most states, the costs of ratifying 
the ICCPR are low because” of a lack of enforcement mechanisms and thus 
authoritarian states that “do not generally act in accordance with the treaty can 
ratify the treaty at little cost” in spite of its basis in democratic principles). 
 40.  See Andreas Auprich, The Democratic Entitlement and the Militancy or 
Not of the Austrian Legal Order, in THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’ PRINCIPLE IN 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 37, 38–39 (Marcus Thiel ed., 2009) (indicating through a 
collection of several sources that “there is no universal democratic concept, as 
democracy depends on particular sociocultural, structural and ethical 
preconditions”).   
 41.  See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International 
Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 49–50 
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (defining popular sovereignty as “the 
notion of citizen consent to the exercise of coercive power within a state,” which 
international law has modestly interpreted with a focus on the electoral process). 
 42.  ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 21 (stipulating that “[e]very citizen shall have 
the right and the opportunity . . . (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”); see also 
Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 
YALE L.J. 539, 552–53 (1992) (arguing that the right to political participation is 
concrete, binding, and enforceable since it is derived from specific treaty language 
in the ICCPR and other international treaties that set a minimum criteria for 
elections to be considered free and fair – namely, that they be by universal, equal 
suffrage, by secret ballot, at reasonable and periodic intervals, and not 
discriminatory against voters or candidates).   
  
1108 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:5 
 
elections.43 
C. RESTRICTIONS TO FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND OTHER SIMILAR 
ARTICLES OF THE ICCPR 
The ICCPR’s list of acceptable restrictions is similar to those 
found in other international conventions providing for the right to 
freedom of assembly.44 There are several key issues in the 
restrictions paragraph that require further attention. First, it is 
necessary to clarify the definition of assembly. Second, in looking at 
perhaps the most pertinent element of justified restrictions, the HRC 
has narrowed the scope of what impingements on the right to 
freedom of assembly can be justified in the interests of national 
security. Third, the implied restrictions on the right to freedom of 
assembly (those not codified in article 21) provide useful background 
to the scope and range of such restrictions: those restrictions are the 
commonly utilized notification requirement and the use of force in 
response to assemblies. 
 
 43.  Cf. U.N. Secretary-General, Support by the United Nations System of the 
Efforts of Government to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, 
¶¶ 29–30, U.N. Doc. A/52/513 (Oct. 21, 2997) [hereinafter U.N. Efforts to 
Promote New Democracies] (acknowledging that while concentration on observing 
elections has been the U.N.’s focus in reviewing a state’s democratic process, 
moving forward “the observation of elections alone will . . . not suffice as a 
yardstick for measuring democratization”).  
 44.  Compare ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 22 (enumerating language limiting 
restrictions on the freedom of assembly such that “[n]o restrictions may be placed 
on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and 
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”), with Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art 11(2), Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these 
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”), and OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 
(1981), reprinted in 21 ILM 59 (1982) (“Every individual shall have the right to 
assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to 
necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the interest 
of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.”).  
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1. Restriction Through the Definition of Assembly 
There is a degree of ambiguity as to what qualifies as an 
“assembly.”45 In the HRC case Kivenmaa v. Finland,46 the plaintiff, a 
Finnish citizen, was charged with violating the country’s Act on 
Public Meetings by holding what the Finnish government considered 
to be a public meeting without the requisite notification.47 In 
response to a visit from a foreign head of state, the plaintiff and 
twenty-five members of her organization gathered across from the 
Presidential Palace amid a larger crowd.48 The plaintiff successfully 
argued that her presence at the Presidential Palace, being amid a 
larger crowd of people, did not fall under Finland’s definition of a 
public meeting that would require an advance notification of at least 
six hours. At the same time, the court held that Finland had violated 
article 21 of the ICCPR by charging the plaintiff with a violation of 
Finland’s protest law.49 Therefore, Kivenmaa established that a 
gathering that fails to meet a state’s definition of assembly might still 
 
 45.  See Human Rights Committee Commc’n 412/1990, Kivenmaa v. Finland, 
50th Sess., Mar. 31, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/49/40, para. 9.2, available at 
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/1994.03.31_Kivenmaa_v_Finland.
htm.  (adjudicating a dispute over whether a group of individuals qualifies as a 
demonstration versus an assembly for the purposes of article 21 of the ICCPR); see 
also Nowak, supra note 7, at 484–86 (clarifying the discussion and intent of the 
HRC in word choice and comparing the language in the ICCPR to other 
international conventions, concluding “the type of assembly has to do with the 
permissible or necessary measures for its protection or limitation”). 
 46.  H.R. Comm. Commc’n 412/1990, supra note 45.   
 47.  Id. para. 2.1.  
 48.  Id. paras. 2.1, 2.3 (focusing on the plaintiff’s argument that “she did not 
organize a public meeting, but only demonstrated her criticism of the alleged 
human rights violations by visiting head of State . . . amid a larger crowd” in 
contrast to the state’s argument that the plaintiff’s group of twenty-five persons 
and their specific behavior were “distinguishable from the crowd and could 
therefore be regarded as a public meeting [when] no other group or subgroup 
which could be characterized as demonstrators, distributing leaflets or displaying 
banners” like the plaintiff were present).  
 49.  Id. para. 9.2 (“Insofar as the State party contends that displaying a banner 
turns [the plaintiff’s] presence into a demonstration, the Committee notes that any 
restrictions upon the right to assemble must fall within the limitation provisions of 
article 21 . . . . [T]he application of Finish legislation on demonstrations to such a 
gathering cannot be considered as an application of a restriction permitted by 
article 21 of the Covenant.”). 
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be protected by article 21 of the ICCPR.50 
2. Explicit Restrictions to Freedom of Assembly in Article 21 
The second noteworthy element of article 21 of the ICCPR is that 
it allows restrictions based on national security interests.51 The HRC 
and other sources narrow the definition of interest of national 
security. In Kim v. Republic of Korea,52 the court held that South 
Korea’s national security claims vis-à-vis North Korea did not render 
the suppression of an assembly organized by the National Coalition 
for Democratic Movement permissible because the state’s claimed 
national security interest was insufficient.53 There, the plaintiff 
prepared and distributed documents that criticized the South Korean 
government, and argued for reunification with North Korea at the 
Movement’s inaugural meeting of 4000 participants.54 Subsequently, 
the plaintiff was arrested and tried under the National Security Law, 
the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations and the Law on 
Repression of Violent Activities for “anti-state” activities.55 
Addressing South Korea’s national security concerns with their 
northern neighbor, the Committee nonetheless held that the influence 
 
 50.  Id. para. 9.2. But see id. para. 2.5 (Herndl, J., dissenting) (questioning the 
seemingly contradictory logic that if the gathering of people at the Presidential 
Palace for the purpose of publicly denouncing the presence of a foreign head of 
state “does not constitute a demonstration, indeed a public gathering within the 
scope of article 21 of the Covenant, what else would constitute a ‘peaceful 
assembly’ in that sense?”). 
 51.  ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 21. 
 52.  Human Rights Committee Commc’n 574/1994, Kim v. Republic of Korea, 
64th Sess., Nov. 3, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/54/40, paras. 12.4–12.5, available at 
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/1998.11.03_Kim_v_Republic_of_
Korea.htm. 
 53.  See id. paras. 12.4–12.5 (reasoning that in South Korea’s case, national 
security was not a viable excuse for quelling Kim’s expression).  
 54.  Id. para. 2.1 (bringing Kim’s case forward as a freedom of expression case 
rather than a freedom of assembly case as would seem more appropriate since 
passing out documents was a byproduct of his initial aim of bringing together 4000 
participants in an assembly). 
 55.  Id. para. 2.3 (focusing the complaint on article 7, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the 
Republic of Korea’s National Security Law proving that “any person who assists 
an anti-State organization by praising or encouraging the activities of this 
organization shall be punished” and that “any person who produces or distributes 
documents, drawings or any other material(s) to the benefit of an anti-State 
organization, shall be punished”).  
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of national security implications on public order in South Korea 
should not be overestimated.56 
Analogizing the HRC’s clarification of national security 
restrictions with respect to freedom of expression in Kim, it seems 
that national security interests cannot be used as a blanket 
justification for state action against the right to freedom of 
assembly.57 Indeed, the national security and public order restrictions 
require narrowing the limiting of acts to those that are truly 
dangerous for state security.58 
3. Implicit Restrictions to Freedom of Assembly in Article 21 
Although article 21 does not explicitly specify the acceptable 
methods for restricting the right to freedom of assembly, states 
commonly require prior notification to organizing a protest or 
demonstration.59 In Kivenmaa the HRC held “that a requirement to 
notify the police of intended demonstration in public place six hours 
before its commencement may be compatible with the permitted 
 
 56.  Id. para. 3.3 (referring to the Comments of the HRC following South 
Korea’s report on measures adopted pursuant to being a new signatory of the 
ICCPR that “[a]lthough the particular situation in which the Republic of Korea 
finds itself has implications on public order in the country, its influence ought not 
to be overestimated. The Committee believes that ordinary laws and specifically 
applicable criminal laws should be sufficient to deal with offences against national 
security”).  
 57.  Id. paras. 12.4–12.5 (stressing the importance of specificity in establishing 
domestic legal justifications for state action in pursuit of national security interests, 
the court found that South Korea’s National Security Law in Kim included vague 
terms that allowed for broad interpretation).  
 58.  Id. para. 12.4; see also Nowak, supra note 7, at 491–92 (concluding that 
“[a]s in comparable provisions of the Covenant (Arts. 12, 13, 14, 19 and 22), 
restrictions on freedom of assembly to protect national security are permissible 
only in serious cases of political or military threat to the entire nation”). 
 59.  H.R. Comm. Commc’n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 8.3; Human Rights 
Committee Commc’n 1157/2003, Coleman v. Australia, 87th Sess., Jul. 17, 2006, 
U.N. Doc. A/61/40, para. 7.3, available at 
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2006.07.17_Coleman_v_Australia.
htm (considering Australia’s notification requirement through a permit system 
where the Committee held that “[e]ven if a State party may introduce a permit 
system aiming to strike a balance between an individual's freedom of speech and 
the general interest in maintaining public order in a certain area, such a system 
must not operate in a way that is incompatible with [the Covenant]”).   
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limitations laid down in article 21 of the Covenant.”60 While six 
hours may be acceptable, the HRC has not provided an explicit upper 
limit for what is considered an acceptable notification requirement.61 
Furthermore, the notification should not be used to quell assembly, 
but rather should invoke a positive duty to ensure that citizens can 
exercise their right to freedom of assembly.62 Therefore, while the 
notification requirement is a legitimate restriction to freedom of 
assembly, it is meant to be a tool used by the state in fulfilling its 
duty to protect its citizenry’s right to freedom of assembly. 
Finally, on the general issue of use of force, the ICCPR requires 
restraint both on the part of the protesters and the state. The right to 
freedom of assembly only covers peaceful protests. Under article 21 
of the ICCPR, protests that use any form of violence are not 
protected.63 Any response or restriction to the right to freedom of 
assembly implies a “principle of proportionality” that requires that 
the means were absolutely necessary to achieve the end.64 Coleman 
v. Australia65 addressed the issue of proportionality in force with 
respect to a similar right under freedom of expression in article 19 of 
the ICCPR.66 There, the plaintiff gave a fifteen to twenty minute 
speech at a shopping mall in Australia and was subsequently 
 
 60.  See H.R. Comm. Commc’n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.2 (emphasis 
added) (suggesting that the court seems reluctant to offer a bright line rule of what 
is an acceptable amount of time to require notification prior to a protest or 
demonstration, and that here even six hours was not definitively within acceptable 
time constraints).  
 61.  See, e.g., id. 
 62.  See Nowak, supra note 7, at 487–88 (clarifying that this positive duty is to 
ensure that the notification requirement be utilized by the state to guarantee 
individuals are “protected against all kinds of interference with the exercise of their 
freedom of assembly”).  
 63.  Id. at 486–87 (defining a peaceful protest as an assembly with the absence 
of violence and weapons and evaluating peacefulness by focusing on the conduct 
of the protesters as opposed to the content of their message).  
 64.  Id. at 491 (expounding on what is meant by proportionality: “The 
prohibition and forceful breaking up of an assembly may therefore ultima ratio 
come under consideration only when all milder means have failed. When there is 
danger of clashes, the organizers of an assembly are primarily responsible for 
preventing disturbances. . . Even the arrest of isolated, violent extremists may be a 
milder means than the collective prohibition of the entire assembly”).  
 65.  H.R. Comm. Commc’n 1157/2003, supra note 59.  
 66.  Id. para. 7.3.  
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convicted for giving a public address without a proper permit from 
the town council.67 The plaintiff was fined $300 and held in custody 
for five days even though, as the court explained, the plaintiff’s 
address was not threatening or unduly disruptive.68 The HRC held 
that the plaintiff’s peaceful presence in a shopping mall did not 
justify the state party’s disproportionate restriction of the plaintiff’s 
rights (by charging him with violating a local law) even if he did not 
adhere to the permit law.69 Therefore, while the HRC has yet to 
establish an explicit test regarding proportionality of laws limiting 
the right to freedom of assembly, permissible restrictions implied in 
the practical applications of article 21 of the ICCPR (that is, 
notifications and use of force against protestors) are subject to a 
consideration of proportionality. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. EGYPT’S TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO 
DEMOCRACY MAKES IT UNCLEAR HOW ARTICLE 21 OF THE 
ICCPR APPLIES 
If the basis for evaluating a state’s democratic character relies on 
the presence of free and fair elections, then Egypt’s newfound (post-
Arab Spring) status meets the criteria.70 However, given that 
international law does not provide a clear definition of democracy71 
from which to determine Egypt’s definitive status, it is necessary to 
evaluate its violations in further detail, especially in the context of its 
tumultuous transition. 
 
 67.  Id. para. 2.1 (describing plaintiff’s actions as an act of individual speech 
protesting government policy, which was penalized as a violation of a public 
address ordinance).  
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. para. 7.3 (holding that such a serious response to a peaceful and 
undisruptive public address by one man was incompatible with the ICCPR’s 
intent). 
 70.  See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (listing the criteria for democracy as first, 
by universal, equal suffrage; second, by secret ballot; third, at reasonable and 
periodic intervals; and fourth, not discriminatory against voters or candidates).  
 71.  See U.N. Efforts to Promote New Democracies, supra note 43, at ¶¶ 29–30 
(explaining that even these criteria is an insufficient “yardstick” for measuring 
democracy). 
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1. International Law Applies to Transitional States 
The volatile situation in Egypt evokes a fascinating question of 
what happens to a country’s international legal obligations to the 
right to freedom of assembly when a transitional state is faced with 
swift and unpredictable changes in their democratic functions. These 
obligations are clear when a country has established democratic 
institutions that can ensure their citizen’s right to freedom of 
assembly.72 The obligations are perhaps even clearer when countries 
without any semblance of democratic functions violate international 
law.73 However, it is unclear how international legal obligations that 
are rooted in principles of democracy74 apply to transitional societies. 
Egypt was still bound to the ICCPR, at least until the military 
declared a state of emergency on August 13, 2013.75 First, unless a 
successive regime or ruler proclaims public emergency or the 
country’s membership is suspended by a certain international 
organization or convention, the state is still bound to those 
international obligations even in periods of democratic transitional 
turmoil.76 For example, following what the African Union 
 
 72.  See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 109 (explaining that 
both democratic and authoritarian states sign on to the ICCPR because the cost of 
doing so outweighs the benefits even though most democratic states naturally 
comply with most aspects of the ICCPR and most authoritarian states do not 
always or even generally act in accordance with the ICCPR, at little cost).  
 73.  Id. at 112 (arguing that human rights compliance is often based on 
cooperation and concern by one state for another state’s adherence to human rights 
norms).  
 74.  Nowak, supra note 7, at 482, 488 (noting that this right requires “stiffer 
duties,” such as providing access to assembly rooms or police protection at events, 
which might not be necessarily feasible in a transitional state). 
 75.  State of Emergency: What Does It Imply?, AHRAM (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79036/Egypt/Politics-/State-of-
emergency-What-does-it-imply-.aspx (explaining the impact of declaring a state of 
emergency on what the state is legally allowed to do for the purposes of security 
including allowing the President or interim leader to arrest citizens without court 
order as well as prohibiting public gatherings, restricting movement through 
curfews and other means, and increasing surveillance on citizens).  
 76.  See International Community Urges Egyptian Authorities to Respect Rule 
of Law and Human Rights, Amid Mixed Reactions to President’s Ouster, INT’L 
JUST. RES. CTR. (July 15, 2013), available at http://www.ijrcenter.org/2013/07/15/ 
international-community-urges-egyptian-authorities-to-respect-rule-of-law-and-
human-rights-amid-mixed-reactions-to-presidents-
ouster/#sthash.ApbrP8GN.2KDLG1Yp.dpbs [hereinafter International Community 
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characterized as a coup d’etat in Egypt, the African Union suspended 
Egypt’s membership until Egypt restored constitutional order.77 
Therefore, since Egypt’s membership to the ICCPR was not 
suspended, it was still bound by the Covenant, including article 21. 
Aside from this bright line rule regarding suspension of 
membership, there is a dearth of legal principles regarding what 
happens to a country’s international legal obligations as it 
experiences transition.78 While the law of state succession governs 
transitioning states, as well as some other legal principles, these legal 
principles do not fully answer the question of the ICCPR article 21’s 
application to a transitional state like post-Arab Spring Egypt.79 
There is one similar HRC case that provides an example of a 
transitional society grappling with ratification of the article on 
freedom of assembly. The plaintiff’s arrest in Kim v. Republic of 
Korea occurred in 1989 when South Korea was in a period of 
transition.80 In 1987 the authoritarian government decided to open 
the political process.81 The HRC held South Korea to its legal 
obligation to the ICCPR, regardless of the country’s status as having 
recently transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy.82 
Therefore, from the one example provided by the HRC thus far, it 
 
Urges Respect Rule of Law and Human Rights]. 
 77.  African Union Communiqué, para. 6, July 5, 2013, 
PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXXIV), available at http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ 
psc-384-com-egypt-05-07-2013.pdf (“[B]y the relevant AU instruments, Council 
decides to suspend the participation of Egypt in the AU’s activities until the 
restoration of constitutional order.”)   
 78.  See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (noting that the HRC found that the 
restriction of freedoms for the purposes of national security was not a sufficient 
reason to suspend the right to assemble, but failing to articulate a clear standard for 
when such rights may be derogable).  
 79.  See id. 
 80.  See History of South Korea: The Transition, LIBR. CONGRESS, available at 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+kr0038%29 
(last updated June 1990) (detailing the troubled history of South Korea and its 
regime changes that precede the 1989 case).  
 81.  See HEEMIN KIM, KOREAN DEMOCRACY IN TRANSITION: A RATIONAL 
BLUEPRINT FOR DEVELOPMENT SOCIETIES (2011), available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780813129952; see also Jerome A. Cohen, Law in 
Political Transitions: Lessons from East Asia and the Road Ahead in China, 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 423, 436–37 (2005). 
 82.  H.R. Comm. Commc’n 574/1994, supra note 52, para. 3.3.  
  
1116 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:5 
 
would seem that countries transitioning into democracy are still 
obligated to their ratification of the ICCPR. Therefore, Egypt is still 
bound by the Covenant since its membership was not suspended and 
the ICCPR applies to states transitioning from authoritarianism to 
democracy like South Korea during the late 1980s. 
B. EGYPT’S POST-ARAB SPRING LAWS AND EVENTS UNDER THE 
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD-LED GOVERNMENT VIOLATED ARTICLE 
21 OF THE ICCPR 
First, this subsection considers events and laws in Egypt prior to 
the July 2013 suspension of the Constitution; then it analyzes the 
military’s actions following the suspension of the Constitution. 
1. Egypt’s Post-Arab Spring Notification Requirement is More 
Restrictive Than the ICCPR Intends 
While Egypt’s 2012 Constitution provided the basis for the right to 
protest, its proposed and adopted laws regarding the restriction in the 
notification requirement went beyond the intention of the drafters of 
the ICCPR and the HRC’s interpretation of this restriction. If in 
Kivenmaa the HRC would only go so far as to say that Finland’s six-
hour notification requirement “may be”83 within the confines of 
article 21 of the ICCPR, Egypt’s law regarding the notification 
requirement went beyond this standard.84 The proposed law required 
demonstration organizers to provide specific details about the time, 
route, and demands of the protest at least three days in advance.85 
Additionally, the law placed unrealistic restrictions on avoiding 
government buildings, which are scattered throughout many cities 
and difficult to recognize.86 Human rights groups in Egypt repeatedly 
denounced this blatant extension of the notification requirement as 
the proposed law gained approval in Egypt’s lower house of 
 
 83.  See H.R. Comm. Commc’n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.2 (showing 
no bright line rule of what is an acceptable amount of time to require notification 
prior to a protest or demonstration). 
 84.  See New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (writing that the law dictates 
that protests cannot come within 200 meters of state buildings, government offices, 
ministry headquarters, and prisons while many of these buildings are scattered all 
across major cities and are not always clearly distinguishable). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
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parliament and then the cabinet.87 
Egypt’s interest in the notification requirement is both for national 
security or public order and for the state’s fulfillment of its duty to 
ensure citizens’ right to freedom of assembly.88 Therefore, the 
purpose of the notification requirement is to allow Egyptian 
authorities to prepare for facilitation of the demonstrations, rather 
than to have notice to impede the demonstrations.89 Foreign 
governments, including the United States, also stressed this positive 
obligation to protect the right to protest on the part of the state.90 
The stipulation of the protest law’s constitutional outline was far 
more restrictive than the ICCPR’s intent of the restrictions. Hence, 
Egypt’s protest laws before the July 2013 suspension of the 
Constitution violated article 21 of ICCPR. 
2. The Military’s Suppression of Pro-Morsi Demonstrations 
Following the July 2013 Suspension of the Constitution Violated 
 
 87.  See Stainburn, supra note 25 (articulating the concerns of the Association 
for Freedom of Thought and Expression and Human Rights Watch; both 
organizations decry the law as “imposing restrictions on the right to demonstrate” 
and as “designed to actually increase restrictions” on the right to assembly); Tom 
Perry & Paul Taylor, Egyptian Cabinet Backs Bill on Protests Critics Cry Foul, 
REUTERS, Feb. 13, 2013, available at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/ 
thomson-reuters/130213/egyptian-cabinet-backs-bill-protests-critics-cry-foul 
(noting the concerns of Human Rights Watch and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
for Human Rights, Michael Posner who called on Egypt to “respect international 
principles of free assembly and association and the critical role civil society plays 
in any democratic society”). 
 88.  See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (determining that while a notification 
requirement can be legitimate restriction to freedom of assembly, it is meant to be 
used in the state’s positive duty in protecting its citizens’ right to freedom of 
assembly). 
 89.  See Nowak, supra note 7, at 482 (“The controversy surrounding the legal 
formulation and practical application of this important political liberty can be 
reduced to the following conflict: on the one hand, assemblies are able to 
contribute to fortifying and maintaining democracy only when they are also, or 
primarily, staged against the interests of State power holders (who altogether too 
often identify themselves with ‘the State’); on the other hand, effective exercise of 
critically oriented freedom of assembly is dependent on the State’s protection.”).   
 90.  See Murray et al., supra note 34 (adding that the international community 
argued that security forces should be compelled to preserve the safety of protestors 
from attempts to attack them or disperse the demonstration or transform it from 
being peaceful).  
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Article 21 of the ICCPR 
Egypt was still bound by its international obligations under the 
ICCPR between July and August 2013 for the following three 
reasons: (1) Egypt’s obligations under the ICCPR were not 
suspended (unlike its African Union membership);91 (2) the Egyptian 
military had not declared a state of emergency until August 14, 
2013;92 and (3) even countries experiencing democratic transitional 
turmoil are bound by their international obligations.93 
a. Egypt Had Legitimate National Security Interests in Restricting 
Freedom of Assembly 
Indeed, the Egyptian military and interim government did have 
national security and public order imperatives in suppressing the pro-
Morsi protests following the President’s ouster on July 3, 2013. 
However, the precedent set by Kim would suggest that, like South 
Korea during its period of transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy in the late 1980s, Egypt’s transitional status does not 
relieve it of its international legal obligations.94 This requirement is 
especially true considering the significance of article 21 in the 
context of democracies and democratizing societies.95 Furthermore, 
Kim established that a demonstration’s danger to national security 
and public order is more narrowly defined than merely relying on 
what the state decides is a national security interest.96 Restrictions on 
 
 91.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (showing that Egypt’s membership to the 
ICCPR was not suspended).  
 92.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that at least until Egypt declared 
a state of emergency, it was bound by the ICCPR). 
 93.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (comparing the situation in South Korea 
in the 1980s to Egypt in 2013 and finding that given the strong similarities between 
the situations, and given that the HRC found that South Korea was still bound 
under ICCPR article 21, Egypt is still similarly bound to protect the right to 
peaceful assembly).  
 94.  See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the HRC’s holding that South 
Korea’s external security threat from and volatile relationship with North Korea 
did not justify the charges brought against Kim).  
 95.  See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (stressing the unique language in article 
21 as compared with other articles in the ICCPR).  
 96.  See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (acknowledging that while Kim was 
uniquely brought forward as a freedom of expression case, the facts were much 
more in line with a freedom of assembly violation, the HRC’s holding on what 
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the right to freedom of assembly in interests of national security are 
limited to serious cases of political or military threat to the country as 
a whole.97 
Regardless of the Egyptian military’s reasons for restricting 
demonstrations, its excessive use of force in quashing a number of 
the peaceful post-July 2013 protests violates article 21.98 Egypt’s use 
of force was excessive because reports clearly indicate that the 
military opened fire on peaceful sit-ins and unarmed protestors.99 
Therefore, there are several strong instances of the military’s actions 
following suspension of the Constitution violating article 21 of the 
ICCPR.100 
 
national security interests justify a suppression of a democratic right is indicative 
of a more narrow definition of actions that are truly dangerous the security of the 
state).  
 97.  Nowak, supra note 7, at 491 (arguing that, in accordance with articles 12, 
13, 14, 19, and 22, only situations that threaten the whole nation, such as “a 
demonstration calling for violent overthrow of the government in an atmosphere of 
political unrest or disseminating propaganda for war . . . may be prohibited by 
criminal law and broken up”).   
 98.  See id. at 491 (clarifying that forceful breaking up of an assembly may be 
considered only when “all milder means have failed”); see also Murray, supra note 
34 (reporting on the events and aftermath of the Egyptian military’s declaration of 
emergency on the night August 14, 2013, and specifically focusing on suggestions 
that protesters in Cairo and Port Said had breached  the curfew, Egypt’s vice-
president, Mohamed El-Baradei resignation in protest against the crackdown with 
first seeking peaceful options for ending the political crisis, as well as reports of 
dozens of bodies from witnesses at Rabaa al-Adawiya, photographs showing more 
than 40 dead laid out on the ground and reports of snipers firing on crowds of 
people despite the interior ministry denial of the live rounds).  
 99.  David Kirkpatrick, Hundreds Die as Egyptian Forces Attack Islamist 
Protestors, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world/middleeast/egypt.html?_r=0 (reporting 
that the ferocity of the military’s response to pro-Morsi assemblies “far exceeded 
the Interior Ministry’s promises of a gradual and measured dispersal,” which 
would have served as Egypt’s milder means of breaking up assemblies as preferred 
in ICCPR language).  
 100.  See International Community Urges Respect Rule of Law and Human 
Rights, supra note 76 (citing Human Rights Comm. Gen. Commt. 29, States of 
Emergency, art. 4, para. 2, Aug. 2, 2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11) 
(explaining that “[a]bsent the necessary declaration of a qualifying public 
emergency, Egypt is obligated to respect and ensure all the rights enshrined in the 
ICCPR,” and noting that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
requested “‘military and law enforcement officials to show utmost restraint and 
make sure that they comply at all times with international human rights obligations 
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3. Egypt’s Transitional Status Falls Within a Gap in International 
Law’s Application of the ICCPR’s Article 21 
The Egyptian military stated that it was acting in an effort to avoid 
civil conflict101 and in some instances protestors escalated the 
demonstrations and disrupted public order, justifying a proportional 
use of force by the military.102 The military’s actions were also 
vindicated because of the gap in international law with regard to 
transitional societies. Although Kim sets a precedent, there are many 
differences between Egypt’s post-Arab Spring democratic transition 
and South Korea’s political situation during Kim.103 The context of 
governmental transitions brought on by the Arab Spring, the 
mobilizing forces of globalization, social media, and empowerment 
of non-state actors makes for a vastly different case for maintaining 
public order and national security in Egypt.104 
 
and international standards on policing, including the UN Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’”). 
 101.  See Lally Weymouth, Rare Interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah al-
Sissi, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
middle_east/rare-interview-with-egyptian-gen-abdel-fatah-al-
sissi/2013/08/03/a77eb37c-fbc4-11e2-a369-d1954abcb7e3_story.html (quoting the 
head of the Egyptian military General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi as taking action to 
prevent civil war and had done so with a mandate from the people of Egypt).  
 102.  See Egyptians Rally in Huge Numbers as Violence Escalates, VOICE OF 
AM. (July 26, 2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/egypts-morsi-detained-on-
charges-of-conspiring-with-hamas/1710421.html (reporting that videos showed 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters firing at other demonstrators who support the 
military’s actions and the interim government, and creating clashes that potentially 
rise to the level of permissible military interference under the ICCPR).  
 103.  See Cohen, supra note 81, at 436 (distinguishing China’s potential 
modernization to meet international legal standards from South Korea’s 
exceptionally smooth transition into democracy after “rapid social, economic, and 
educational progress” paved the way for political circumstances to lead to a 
democratic legal system).   
 104.  Without the tools of instant communication outside control of the state, the 
ability of the citizens to build and organize a revolution grew much more rapidly in 
Egypt than it did in South Korea. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Egypt’s Revolution by 
Social Media: Facebook and Twitter let the people keep ahead of the regime, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703786804576137980252
177072 (highlighting the significance of social media in Egypt’s quick political 
transition out of authoritarianism as well as Egypt’s poverty, education, and 
political realities).  
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There are other international legal principles that govern a state’s 
transitional period. In looking closer at the legal implications of a 
state’s transition, the law of succession of states governs this period 
in Egypt’s history. Succession of states law stems from the 
international relations theory concerning the recognition and 
acceptance of newly created sovereign states.105 Though its roots 
stem farther back, the U.N. General Assembly codified the concept 
in 1978 through the U.N. Conference on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties.106 However, as the succession of states theory 
was born out of a context of colonialism and “newly independent” 
states,107 it is not particularly applicable to previously existing states 
that have merely experienced a transition in regimes or 
governments.108 
 
 105.  Konrad G. Buhler, State Succession and Membership in International 
Organizations, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Vol. 38, 164, 
(Martinus Nijhoff).   
 106.  Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 
22, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488, pmbl. (stating that “the present convention applies to the 
effects of succession of States in respect to treaties between States”).  
 107.  Id. at 1499.  
 108.  In addition to state succession, two other international legal principles 
govern transitional states. First, transitional justice deals with state’s emerging 
from serious conflict and prescribes methods for addressing past abuses. See Louis 
Bickford, Transitional Justice, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY 1045, 1045 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2004) (defining transitional 
justice as “a field of activity and inquiry focused on how societies address legacies 
of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, 
including genocide or civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just or 
peaceful future”). While there are elements of transitional justice that could and do 
apply to post-Arab Spring transitional societies, with regard to specific countries 
such as Egypt, that did not experience serious civil conflict or war at the inception 
of their transition (unlike Syria or Libya), this is not particularly pertinent. For 
countries like Egypt, and South Korea in the late 1980s, the focus on a possible 
violation of article 21 of the ICCPR is not so much toward the previous regime’s 
accountability but rather the current and perhaps ever-changing regime’s 
accountability. Second, in further looking at conflict zones that are going through 
transition, reconstruction in transition often relies on what the United Nations 
refers to as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (“DDR”) efforts. See 
Shana Tabak, False Dichotomies of Transitional Justice: Gender, Conflict and 
Combatants in Columbia, 44 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POL. 104, 108 (2011) 
(distinguishing DDR as separate from transitional justice in that it is concerned 
primarily with former combatants and security alone “whereas transitional justice 
incorporates a wider spectrum of individuals, may take years to implement after 
conflict, and is concerned with accountability, truth-seeking and redress for past 
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Therefore, post-Arab Spring states such as Egypt suffer from a 
Goldilocks complex: the East Asian transitional period serves as too 
mild a model, as there was not the same rapid turning of events in 
South Korea during the late 1980s. Governments experiencing newly 
independent succession, transitional justice, or Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration-relevant turmoil, are dealing with 
more fundamental state-formation issues.109 International law fails to 
provide an option that is somewhere in between. 
Nonetheless, while it is unclear that the ICCPR should govern 
such a transitional period, if it did apply, then it is clear that Egypt 
has repeatedly violated article 21 of the ICCPR in its post-Arab 
Spring transitional period.110 It is indisputable that Egypt violated 
article 21 by first, stipulating law that was counter to the ICCPR’s 
intentions in restrictions to freedom of assembly, and second, by 
quashing peaceful protests during and after President Morsi’s ouster 
and suspension of the constitution. In the first instance, it is clear that 
the government under the leadership of President Morsi and the 
Muslim Brotherhood was attempting to limit Egyptians’ right to 
freedom of assembly out of a primary concern for the state’s 
interests.111 Indeed, prohibiting demonstrations or making them 
logistically impossible violates article 21 of the ICCPR.112 
 
wrongs”). However, since DDR is primarily concerned with combatants and 
security imperatives, this theory again falls short of addressing the issues of 
something like a right to freedom of assembly within a more stable and controlled 
transitional society where the government is organically moving from 
authoritarianism to democracy.  
 109.  See generally Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute 
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1990). 
 110.  See Kirkpatrick, supra note 99 (reporting on brutal tactics used by military 
to quash pro-Morsi protests); Sarah Leah Whitson, Letter to Egyptian Justice 
Minister on Demonstration Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 25, 2013), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/25/letter-egyptian-justice-minister-
demonstrations-law. 
 111.  See New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (writing the rights groups’ 
perspective that in addition to obligating “demonstration organi[z]ers to give an 
official notice to the authorities about the time, route and demands of any protest 
three days in advance,” the protest law puts unrealistic restrictions by prohibiting 
the route of protests and demonstrations to go near government buildings which 
are ubiquitous in Egypt’s major cities, especially Cairo).  
 112.  Whitson, supra note 110 (arguing that Egypt has an obligation to confirm 
with the requirements of article 21 of the ICCPR by re-drafting the demonstration 
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Additionally, such abuse of the restriction clause goes against an 
important and unique element of the whole right in that it is counter 
to basic democratic principles, which Egypt has been trying to 
pursue and attain following the end of President Mubarak’s reign.113 
Furthermore, following President Morsi’s ouster and the 
suspension of the Constitution, no amount of justifications can 
excuse the Egyptian military’s gross response to peaceful pro-Morsi 
protests.114 In the violence that erupted following what critics called a 
coup d’etat by the Egyptian military, the violations of article 21 of 
the ICCPR are blatant, regardless of Egypt’s transitional status.115 
The ICCPR does not explicitly allow room for transitional societies 
to ignore their international legal obligations either in its text or 
through interpretations by the HRC.116 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Egypt has not signed or ratified the Second Optional Protocol of 
the ICCPR, which gives the HRC jurisdiction over signatories of the 
ICCPR.117 Therefore, methods of litigation and enforcement through 
the HRC, such as those in Kim and Kivenmaa, are not options 
 
law to include protections for civilians and de-criminalizing the right demonstrate).  
 113.  See discussion supra Part III.B.1 (articulating that states may not impose 
undue restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly).  
 114.  Though it is conceded that there were violent pro-Morsi protests as well, 
the protests that are at issue for the purposes of the ICCPR are the peaceful ones. 
See Liz Sly & Sharaf al-Hourani, Egypt Authorizes Use of Live Ammunition 




 115.  See Murray, note 34 (reporting on the Egyptian military’s excessive use of 
force).   
 116.  See ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; H.R. Comm. Commc’n 574/1994, supra 
note 52, para. 12.4–12.6 (applying the same standard as other countries on South 
Korea regardless of its newly established democratic transition and in spite of the 
fact that “the particular situation in which the Republic of Korea finds itself has 
implications on public order in the country”).   
 117.  Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 
U.N.T.S. 414, 414 (creating the HRC which has jurisdiction over state parties to 
the ICCPR and allows individuals to bring complaints of violations to the 
Committee).  
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moving forward in Egypt’s case.118 
A. EGYPT SHOULD SIGN THE SECOND OPTIONAL PROTOCOL OF 
THE ICCPR 
First, this comment recommends that Egypt sign the Second 
Optional Protocol, as other countries have done, to ensure that there 
are adjudication methods for the principles that Egypt signed on to 
when it ratified the ICCPR. If Egypt were to sign on to the Second 
Optional Protocol then it would send a clear message of its 
commitment to human rights and democratic principles in the 
transitional period after President Mubarak’s thirty-year authoritarian 
rule.119 This would benefit Egypt both in the short and long term as it 
builds its influence in the global arena,120 in addition to providing 
Egyptian rights groups with a forum for adjudicating violations to the 
ICCPR’s article 21 and other articles. 
B. FUTURE ITERATIONS OF EGYPT’S CONSTITUTION AND PROTEST 
LAWS SHOULD MODIFY THE PREVIOUS PROTEST LAWS UNDER THE 
2012 CONSTITUTION BY REMOVING EXCESSIVE RESTRICTIONS ON 
THE RIGHT TO PROTEST THROUGH A PROHIBITIVE NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENT 
Until Egypt signs the Second Optional Protocol, the international 
community must rely on alternative methods to hold Egypt 
 
 118.  See H.R. Comm. Commc’n 574/1994, supra note 52, para. 3.3 (holding 
that by becoming a state party to the Second Optional Protocol, Korea “has 
recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been 
a violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, 
the state party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an 
effective and enforceable remedy”); see also H.R. Comm. Commc’n 412/1990, 
supra note 45, para. 9.1 (using similar language as Kim to establish jurisdiction 
over the case). 
 119.   See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 39, at 131 (explaining why 
ratification of human rights treaties is especially important for a state transitioning 
from authoritarianism to democracy in that not doing so “sends an unambiguous 
and believable signal that it is not committed to human rights, and thus (perhaps) is 
not deserving of collateral benefits that might flow to a human rights-respecting 
state, such as recognition and trade”).  
 120.  Id. (noting that the non-ratification is often “viewed as evidence of 
unreliability on the issue.”). 
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accountable for its violations of article 21. Regarding the pre-July 
2013 suspension of the Constitution, President Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood will likely not be held accountable internationally and 
domestically for the laws that were passed limiting the right to 
protest beyond their removal from power by the military.121 
However, the analysis used to indicate their impingement on the 
right to protest is useful for future leaders who attempt to implement 
a notification requirement or some other pre-demonstration 
restriction.122 Currently, Egypt is in the process of determining who 
is to lead its future government and a committee has been put in 
place to rewrite the entire Constitution.123 Regarding future versions 
of the protest law, this comment recommends that Egypt strike a 
better balance between maintaining order and allowing for freedom 
of assembly. 
It is necessary for any democratic or democratizing society to 
maintain this balance by keeping the contours of its notification 
requirement but removing its excessively restrictive qualities.124 This 
balance can be achieved by lowering the amount of time required by 
the notification requirement from three days to something closer to 
Finland’s six-hour requirement that the HRC considered.125 
Furthermore, the previous protest law required that demonstrations 
 
 121.  See, e.g., Amro Hassad, Egypt’s Morsi Stands Trial on Charges of 
Espionage and Terrorism, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2014/feb/16/world/la-fg-wn-morsi-trial-20140216 (listing the charges that Morsi is 
facing: Espionage, terrorism, and disclosing military secrets to a foreign state, and 
not mentioning the protest law). 
 122.  See discussion supra Part III.B.1 (comparing Egypt’s restrictive protest 
law with that of Finland’s as considered by the HRC in Kivenmaa).  
 123.  See Fady Ashraf, Constituent Assembly to Write New Constitution Moussa, 
DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/10/02/ 
constituent-assembly-to-write-new-constitution-moussa/  
(reporting that a committee originally tasked with amending the Constitution chose 
to write a new Constitution because of the magnitude of changes originally 
proposed).  
 124.  Compare H.R. Comm. Commc’n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.2 
(concluding that a six hour prior notification requirement may be consistent with 
international legal right to freedom of assembly as enshrined within article 21 of 
the ICCPR), with New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (reporting in March 
2013 on the protest law, which included a three day prior notice requirement as 
well as impracticable restrictions on the location of demonstrations).  
 125.  H.R. Comm. Commc’n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.2. 
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avoid government buildings, making them logistically impossible.126 
While security and public order are legitimate concerns for the 
government, this restriction of movement extends beyond the intent 
of article 21 of the ICCPR.127 As previously mentioned, the right to 
protest imbues the state with a positive obligation.128 Future iterations 
of the protest law should remove this excessive restriction on 
movement rather than making it logistically impossible for 
organizers of demonstrations to legally exercise their right to protest. 
The next iteration of laws dealing with the right to protest seems 
more restrictive than those under President Morsi and the 2012 
Constitution. In late November 2013 after authorities lifted the three-
month state of emergency, Egypt’s interim President, Adly Mansour, 
signed into law new rules regarding the right to protest.129 Adding to 
the three-day notification requirement under the previous law before 
the July 2013 suspension of the Constitution, the most recent draft 
law allows the police to deny a public gathering of more than ten 
people without justification or a court order.130 Though the country 
has seen near-daily protests since President Morsi’s resignation and 
the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining order, it is clear that 
 
 126.  See New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (reporting on concerns of 
the Independent Association for Legal Support that the proposed demonstration 
law’s requirement that protests remain at least 200 meters from state buildings 
made it nearly impossible for protesters to be sure that they are not violating the 
protest restrictions and giving ample opportunity for officials to prohibit a 
demonstration if they wanted).  
 127.  See id.; see also discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 128.  See Nowak, supra note 7, at 487–88 (clarifying that a positive duty may be 
fulfilled through a notification requirement to be utilized by the state in ensuring 
that demonstrations are protected against interference so they may exercise their 
right to freedom of assembly).  
 129.  See Gregg Carlstrom, Egypt Passes Law Restricting Public Protests, AL 
JAZEERA (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/ 
egypt-passes-law-restricting-public-protests-2013112413847867334.html.   
 130.  See Kristen Chick, Twilight in Tahrir: Egypt Law Aims to Sharply Curb 
Protest, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
World/Security-Watch/2013/1124/Twilight-in-Tahrir-Egypt-law-aims-to-sharply-
curb-protest (reporting that 20 Egyptian rights organizations issued a joint 
statement warning that the law “would serve as the legal basis for the re-
establishment of the police state seen in Egypt prior to January 25, 2011, when 
numerous exceptional policies and laws had given free reign to the security 
apparatus to violate the rights and freedoms of citizens in the name of ‘countering 
terrorism’”).  
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these measures aim to stifle the Egyptian people’s right to protest by 
providing officials more authority to deny and break up protests.131 
Many rights groups warn that these protest laws are reminiscent of 
Mubarak-era policies.132 Egypt should not, therefore, allow these 
restrictions on the right to protest as it transitions into democracy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The democratic function is at the heart of article 21 of the ICCPR, 
the right to freedom of assembly. As post-Arab Spring societies, such 
as Egypt, continue through the challenges of the democratic process, 
the people’s right to protest likewise continues to oscillate between a 
civil rights victory and state-interest limitations. Though it is not 
completely clear how an ICCPR article that relies so heavily on 
democratic principles applies to a society in the throes of achieving 
democracy, it is clear that Egypt’s actions in its post-Arab Spring 
transitional period violated the ICCPR’s article 21 in two general 
instances. First, through the implementation of a notification 
requirement that impinged on the people’s right to freedom of 
assembly, and second, in the military’s clampdown on 
demonstrations following the President’s ouster and suspension of 
the Constitution in July 2013. 
While Egypt cannot be held accountable for violations of article 
21 of the ICCPR through a complaint submitted to the HRC, there 
are many alternatives to utilize international law relating to the right 
to protest as a tool to guide societies that are transitioning through 
the democratic process. Holding Egypt accountable by some means 
is of paramount importance in the context of the greater Middle East 
because of the significance of Egyptian politics as a model and 
 
 131.  See Protest Law Bans Sit-ins, Allows Harsh Security Measures, MADA 
MASR (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.madamasr.com/content/protest-law-bans-sit-
ins-allows-harsh-security-measures (reporting that security forces are required to 
disperse demonstrations that violate the detailed restrictions by firing water 
cannons, tear gas, beating protesters with batons and “if required for legitimate 
self-defense and protection of assets, more force would be authorized”).  
 132.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EGYPT (Jan. 
2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/egypt 
(noting the increase of laws that restrict freedom of expression from the Mubarak-
era, as well as the continued application of “the repressive Mubarak-era law 84 on 
associations”).  
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catalyst for other transitional societies, such as Tunisia133 and beyond 
the post-Arab Spring context. 
 
 
 133.  See, e.g., Tunisia’s Tamarod Steps Up Campaign to Dissolve Parliament, 
EGYPT INDEP. (July 14, 2013), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/tunisia-s-
tamarod-steps-campaign-dissolve-parliament (reporting on a copycat Tamarod 
(rebel) campaign gaining traction in Tunisia, and noting the “strong ties” between 
Egypt and Tunisia).  
